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Abstract
Mean field games formalize dynamic games with a continuum of players and ex-
plicit interaction where the players can have heterogeneous states. As they addi-
tionally yield approximate equilibria of corresponding N -player games, they are of
great interest for socio-economic applications. However, most techniques used for
mean field games rely on assumptions that imply that for each population distri-
bution there is a unique optimizer of the Hamiltonian. For finite action spaces, this
will only hold for trivial models. Thus, the techniques used so far are not applica-
ble. We propose a model with finite state and action space, where the dynamics
are given by a time-inhomogeneous Markov chain that might depend on the cur-
rent population distribution. We show existence of stationary mean field equilibria
in mixed strategies under mild assumptions and propose techniques to compute
all these equilibria. More precisely, our results allow — given that the generators
are irreducible – to characterize the set of stationary mean field equilibria as the
set of all fixed points of a map completely characterized by the transition rates
and rewards for deterministic strategies. Additionally, we propose several partial
results for the case of non-irreducible generators and we demonstrate the presented
techniques on two examples.
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1. Introduction
Mean field games have been introduced independently by Lasry and Lions (2007) and
Huang et al. (2006) in order to provide a framework for dynamic stochastic games in
continuous time with a continuum of players, whose equilibria furthermore serve as
approximate Nash equilibria for corresponding N -player games. The main feature of
these games is that any player does not observe the state and action of each other player
individually, but only at an aggregated level through the empirical distribution of these
characteristics.
From an economic perspective these games are of particular interest as they yield a formal
way to describe games with a continuum of rational players that accounts for explicit
interaction (in contrast to the classical assumption in general equilibrium theory that
“prices mediate all social interaction” (Gue´ant et al., 2011)) as well as heterogeneity
of states (in contrast to representative agent models (see Gomes et al. (2015, p.209))).
Therefore a wide range of economic models relying on mean field games emerged, which
includes growth models, the production of an exhaustible resource by a continuum of
producers as well as opinion dynamics (see Gomes et al. (2015), Gue´ant et al. (2011),
Caines et al. (2017) and the references therein).
In classical mean field games models each individual player’s dynamics is given by a
diffusion process whose drift and volatility depend on time, the current state and the
current action of the individual player as well as the current distribution of all players.
Each player individually solves an optimal control problem given these dynamics, where
the costs also depend on the current state and action of the individual player as well as
distribution of all players. A mean field equilibrium is then given by a flow of population
distributions m such that there is an optimal strategy pi for the individual control prob-
lem given m and the distribution of the individual player given this strategy is in turn
m. This is a natural analogue of a Nash equilibrium of games with N players: Given
that all players play the strategy pi, no player wants to deviate from playing pi, as the
population distribution is m and pi is a best response to it.
To solve this type of mean field games one then sets up several assumptions, which
usually include the assumption that there is a unique optimizer of the Hamiltonian.
Then one can show that finding a mean field equilibrium boils down to solving a system
of a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation coupled with a Fokker-Planck-equation – or if
one prefers the probabilistic approach – to a Forward-Backward Stochastic Differential
Equation (FBSDE). The forward-backward structure of these differential equations is
non-standard and a wide range of the literature regarding mean field games covers the
analysis of these equations. For more details consider Bensoussan et al. (2013) and
Carmona and Delarue (2018a,b) as well as the references therein. We remark, that
in Lacker (2015) existence of mean field equilibria in mixed strategies is proven under
continuity, measureability and boundedness conditions, which, in particular, do not
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include the assumption that a unique optimizer of the Hamiltonian exists. A similar
existence result for mean field games with controlled jump-diffusion dynamics can be
found in Benazzoli et al. (2018).
In Gomes et al. (2010, 2013) mean field games with finite state space have been intro-
duced and thereafter several other (more general) mean field game models with finite
state spaces haven been considered. We give an overview at the end of the introduc-
tion. Also applications of mean field games with finite state space have been considered.
However, several applications consider finite action spaces (for example Kolokoltsov and
Bensoussan (2016), Kolokoltsov and Malafeyev (2017), Gue´ant (2009a) and Besancenot
and Dogguy (2015)) and for this type of models the literature covers only an existence re-
sult in mixed strategies (also called relaxed strategies) (see Cecchin and Fischer (2018)).
Indeed, for non-trivial models with finite action spaces there are always population distri-
butions for which more than one optimizer of the Hamiltonian exists, in which case most
of the techniques presented in the literature so far are not applicable. For this reason for
the previously mentioned examples the authors develop their own tools to solve their par-
ticular model: Kolokoltsov and Bensoussan(2016) and Kolokoltsov and Malafeyev(2017)
only analyse stationary equilibria in deterministic strategies, Gueant(2009a) and Be-
sancenot and Dogguy(2015) set up a dynamics equation only after analysing optimal
decisions given a certain population distribution. They then also focus on stationary
equilibria, as well as the dynamic behaviour close to these stationary equilibria and the
effect of shocks.
In this paper, we will present general tools to compute stationary equilibria of mean
field games with finite state and action space: We introduce the notion of stationary
mean field equilibria into the mean field game model with finite state and finite action
space presented in Doncel et al. (2016a). We remark that we consider a stationary
equilibrium in an infinite horizon mean field game where the expected discounted reward
(
∫∞
0
e−βt . . .) is maximized and not, as in many other settings, a stationary (ergodic)
equilibrium, where the expected average reward (lim supT→∞
∫ T
0
. . .) is maximized. Since
the analytic formulation of Doncel et al. (2016a) is not suitable for this task, we formulate
the model in a probabilistic way: The individual dynamics of a player is given by a
time-inhomogeneous continuous time Markov chain with the generator depending on
the current action and the current distribution of the population; the costs depend on
the current state as well as the current action of the individual player and the current
population distribution. As in Doncel et al. (2016a) in the case of dynamic equilibria,
we only prove existence of stationary mean field equilibria in mixed strategies.
We focus on stationary equilibria for several reasons: First, searching for stationary
equilibria reduces the complexity of the considered problem. More precisely, we can
utilize the standard theory on Markov decision process with stationary transition rates
and rewards and we can considered a fixed point problem in RS instead of a fixed point
problem in some function space. Second, the main focus of the economic models stud-
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ied so far also lies in stationary equilibria. Third and linked to the last reason, one can
often establish some kind of convergence/adjustment process towards stationary equilib-
ria. More precisely, Gomes et al. (2013) prove that for mean field games with finite state
space under certain assumptions every dynamic mean field equilibrium converges to the
stationary (ergodic) equilibrium. In the case of continuous state spaces Cardaliaguet
et al. (2012, 2013) proves that under certain assumptions every dynamic mean field
equilibrium converges to the stationary (ergodic) equilibrium and Gue´ant (2009b) de-
scribes a cognitive process that converges if it is started close to stationary equilibrium
indeed to the stationary (ergodic) equilibrium. Moreover, in the examples presented
by Gue´ant (2009a) and Besancenot and Dogguy (2015) it is shown that there is local
convergence of the trajectories of the dynamic equilibrium to the stationary (discounted
reward) equilibrium.
Relying on our probabilistic formulation of the model, we will show existence of station-
ary equilibria under the same conditions as in the dynamic case. This is compared to
Gomes et al. (2013) a surprising result as they need several additional assumptions com-
pared to the dynamic existence result to establish existence of stationary equilibria.
Thereafter, we derive tools to compute all stationary equilibria (including those where
the equilibrium strategy randomizes over different actions). As in standard mean field
game models, we first have to solve an optimal control problem given a fixed flow of
population distribution and second a fixed point problem, namely searching for flows
of population distributions m such that m is the distribution of an individual player
playing optimal given m. We will see that the first problem is equivalent to solving a
standard Markov decision process with expected discounted reward criterion and we will
show that the set of all randomized optimal stationary strategies is the convex hull of all
deterministic optimal stationary strategies. For general dynamics, we cannot simplify
the fixed point problem directly but we will provide a generally applicable reformulation
of the necessary and sufficient balance equations inspired by the cut criterion for standard
Markov chains, which often proves helpful in examples. Assuming irreducibility of the
generators of the individual dynamics given any population distribution and any strategy,
we can obtain all distributions of stationary equilibria as the fixed points of a set-valued
map with convex values, which can be completely characterized by the transition rates
and rewards given deterministic strategies.
1.1. Related Literature
As indicated previously we would like to sketch briefly the research regarding finite state
mean field games: The starting point regarding the study of finite state mean field games
were the models of Gomes et al. (2010) (in discrete time), Gomes et al. (2013) and Gue´ant
(2011, 2015). We will focus on the continuous time models here: In both models, fully
controllable transition rates are considered (Gue´ant (2011, 2015) additionally assumes
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that the players might not reach all other states from a given state) such that the
player’s dynamics is given by a time-inhomogeneous Markov chain. The costs consist of
instantaneous costs depending on the current state and action of the individual player as
well as the current distribution of all players together with a terminal cost depending on
the current state of the individual player and the current distribution of all players. In
both models, assumptions are set up such that there is always a unique optimizer of the
Hamiltonian. For both models then a system of forward-backward ODEs is presented,
the solution of which yields a mean field equilibrium. Moreover, existence and uniqueness
of solutions to these equations is discussed.
Gue´ant (2011) discusses further sufficient conditions for the existence of mean field equi-
libria (including a discrete state master equation); Gomes et al. (2013) studies stationary
equilibria and establishes for contractive mean field games that a trend to equilibrium
exists. Gomes et al. (2013) furthermore study an N -player game and the convergence of
this game to the mean field game model. Additionally, as in the diffusion-based models,
the class of potential mean field games is introduced, which has a simpler cost structure
and, thus, allows for deeper results. Namely, the costs split in two additive terms, one
term depending on the current state and the current population distribution, which is
furthermore the gradient of a convex function, as well as one term depending on the
current state and current action.
Several other authors discuss similar questions in models with more general individual
dynamics, in particular the transition rates might not be fully controllable, but again
assumptions were set which imply that there is a unique optimizer of the Hamiltonian:
Carmona and Delarue (2018a, Chapter 7.2) provide a discussion of finite state mean field
games, which is closely related to their exposition of standard mean field games models
with continuous state space. They consider models in which transition rates depend
on the current state, the current action and the population distribution and discuss
existence and uniqueness results as well as a master equation. Basna et al. (2014)
discusses mean field games were the dynamics are given by a non-linear Markov process
with a generator that might additionally depend on the distribution of all other players
and show under several assumptions that mean field equilibria are 1
N
-Nash equilibria for
the corresponding N -player games.
Cecchin and Fischer (2018) present a mean field game with the individual dynamics given
by stochastic differential equation driven by a stationary Poisson random measure, where
again a dependence on the current population distribution is possible. They discuss
existence (also in mixed strategies under mild continuity and boundedness assumptions)
and uniqueness of mean field equilibria and furthermore show that mean field equilibria
in open-loop and feedback strategies are N -Nash equilibria for the corresponding N -
player game. Carmona and Wang (2018) provide a mean field game model with the
dynamics given by a continuous time Markov chain with a generator which might depend
on the current distributions of the states as well as the actions of all players. Using the
semimartingale representation of continuous time Markov chains they again consider
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existence, uniqueness and the question when a mean field equilibrium is an approximate
Nash equilibrium for the corresponding N -player game.
The model of Doncel et al. (2016a) (which we consider in this paper) does not require a
unique optimizer of the Hamiltonian, but instead it is directly assumed that the action
space is finite. The dynamics of each individual player are given by a differential equation
specifying the transition rates, which in turn depend on the individual’s state and action
as well as on the current population distribution. Existence of dynamic mean field
equilibria is shown and a discrete time N -player game is considered, for which it is
shown that mean field equilibria are -Nash equilibria. Furthermore, the question of
convergence is considered. More precisely, given a sequence of strategies (piN)N∈N which
are equilibria in the N -player game is there some sub-sequence converging to a mean
field equilibrium? The answer to this question is positive if one considers local strategies
(which only depend on the current state and time), but negative if one considers Markov
strategies (which also depend on the current distribution of all players). The intuitive
reason for this is that the “tit-for-tat”-principle cannot be applied in the limit (see
Doncel et al. (2016b) for more details).
1.2. Organization of the Paper
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the model in a probabilistic
formulation. Section 3 discusses the individual control problem. In Section 4 we show
that for all models fitting into our framework a stationary mean field equilibrium in
mixed strategies exists. Section 5 first discusses the generally applicable cut criterion
for our setting, then - given irreducibility of the generator - we propose a characterization
of the set of all distributions of stationary mean field equilibria as the set of all fixed
points of a suitable set-valued map which is completely determined by the dynamics and
rewards given the deterministic strategies. Section 6 concludes the paper by showing
how the presented tools can be applied to find stationary mean field equilibria in two
examples.
2. The Model
Let S = {1, . . . , S} (S > 1) be the set of possible states of each player and let A =
{1, . . . , A} be the set of possible actions. With P(S) we denote the probability simplex
over S and similarly for P(A). A (mixed) strategy is a measurable function pi : S ×
[0,∞)→ P(A), (i, t) 7→ (piia(t))a∈A with the interpretation that piia(t) is the probability
that at time t and in state i the player chooses action a. We say that a strategy
pi = d : S × [0,∞) → P(A) is deterministic if it satisfies for all t ≥ 0 and for all
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i ∈ S that there is an a ∈ A such that dia(t) = 1 and dia′ = 0 for all a′ ∈ A \ {a}.
Throughout the presentation we often use the following equivalent representation, which
is to represent a deterministic strategy as a function d : S × [0,∞) → A, (i, t) 7→ di(t)
with the interpretation that di(t) = a states that at time t in state i action a is chosen.
With Π we denote the set of all (mixed) strategies and with D the set of all deterministic
strategies.
The individual dynamics of each player given a flow of population distributions m :
[0,∞) → P(S) and a strategy pi : S × [0,∞) → P(A) are given as a Markov process
Xpi(m) on a given probability space (Ω,F ,P) with given initial distribution x0 and
infinitesimal generator given by the Q(t)-matrix
(Qpi(m(t), t))ij =
∑
a∈A
Qija(m(t))piia(t),
where for all a ∈ A and m ∈ P(S) the matrices (Q··a(m)) are conservative generators,
that is Qija(m) ≥ 0 for all i, j ∈ S with i 6= j and
∑
j∈S Qija(m) = 0 for all i ∈ S.
Given the initial condition x0 ∈ P(S), the goal of each player is to maximize his expected
reward, which is given by
V x0(pi
0,m) =
∫ ∞
0
(∑
i∈S
∑
a∈A
xpi0i (t)ria(m(t))pi
0
i,a(t)
)
e−βtdt, (1)
where xi(t) is the probability that the individual player is in state i at time t, r :
S×A×P(S)→ R is a real-valued function and β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. That is,
for a fixed population distribution m : [0,∞) 7→ P(S) we face a Markov decision process
with expected discounted reward criterion and time-inhomogeneous reward functions
and transition rates.
We will work under the following mild continuity assumption, which will ensure that
there is indeed a Markov process with generator Qpi (see Guo and Herna´ndez-Lerma
(2009, Appendix B+C) for details):
Assumption A1. For all i, j ∈ S and all a ∈ A the function m 7→ Qija(m) mapping
from P(S) to R is Lipschitz-continuous in m . For all i ∈ S and all a ∈ A the function
m 7→ ria(m) mapping from P(S) to R is continuous in m.
With these preparations, we can introduce the concept of dynamic mean field equilib-
ria:
Definition 2.1. Given an initial distribution m0, a mean field equilibrium is a flow
of population distributions m : [0,∞) → P(S) with m(0) = m0 and a strategy pi :
S × [0,∞)→ P(A) such that
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• the distribution of the process Xpi(m) at time t is given by m(t)
• V m0(pi,m) ≥ V m0(pi′,m) for all pi′ ∈ Π .
As in standard game theory, our concept of mean field equilibrium captures the intuitive
idea that no player wants to deviate: Given that all players play according to strategy
pi the population’s distribution will be m. If an individual player now evaluates whether
he wants to deviate from playing pi he asks whether there is a strategy that yields a
higher payoff given m. Due to the second condition this is not possible. Therefore, we
indeed face an equilibrium in the standard economic sense.
Remark 2.1. Using the Kolmogorov forward equation (Guo and Herna´ndez-Lerma, 2009,
Proposition C.4), we see that the first condition implies the analytic condition used in
Doncel et al. (2016a) to characterize mean field equilibria, which states that m is solution
of
m˙j(t) =
∑
i∈S
mi(t)Q
pi
ij(m(t), t) ∀j ∈ S
with initial condition m(0) = m0.
Remark 2.2. The definition of strategies we adopt here is unusual in classical game
theory. However, in the setting of mean field games it is sensible. Indeed, given the
initial state of the system and the strategy of the other players the behaviour of the
system is fully determined. Thus, it suffices for the individual agent to know the initial
global state (see Caines et al. (2017)).
In order to define stationary mean field equilibria, we first introduce the notion of sta-
tionary strategies: A stationary strategy is a map pi : S × [0,∞) → P(A) such that
piia(t) = piia for all t ≥ 0. Again we denote by Πs the set of all stationary strategies and
by Ds the set of all deterministic stationary strategies.
Definition 2.2. A stationary mean field equilibrium is given by a stationary strategy
pi and a vector m ∈ P(S) such that
• the law of Xpi(m) at any point in time t is given by m
• for any initial distribution x0 ∈ P(S) we have V x0(pi,m) ≥ V x0(pi′,m) for all
pi′ ∈ Π.
This notion is a sensible formalization of stationary equilibria: Given the strategy pi the
population’s distribution will be m for all time points. An individual agent at a given
time point can be in any state, however, if he evaluates whether he wants to deviate
from playing pi, the second condition ensures that this is not beneficial for him. Thus,
he has no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium strategy pi, which means that the
population will indeed remain in the stationary equilibrium regime of playing pi.
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Remark 2.3. We remark that the matrix Qpiij(m, t) does not depend on t in this context,
therefore, we write Qpiij(m) := Q
pi
ij(m, t). Using this, we obtain that the first condition is
equivalent to
0 =
∑
i∈S
miQ
pi
ij(m) ∀j ∈ S.
Moreover, we remark that the second condition requires pi to be optimal among all
strategies, not only those that are stationary.
Remark 2.4. In contrast to the standard models where the assumptions usually imply
that a unique optimal best response exists, the mean field equilibria we consider are
not fully specified by the distribution, as it might happen that several actions are si-
multaneously optimal and induce the same distribution. However, the dynamic mean
field equilibrium is fully specified by describing the equilibrium strategy, as one can
show using standard techniques (Walter, 1998, Theorem 10.XX) that there is at most
one solution to the differential equation. For the stationary mean field equilibrium, this
again does not hold true, as it might happen that given a strategy there are multiple
stationary distributions. For this reason, we define mean field equilibria always as pairs
of the equilibrium distribution and the equilibrium strategy.
Remark 2.5. We remark that for non-trivial models (in the sense that there is not one
action that maximizes the Hamiltonian for every population distribution) we always ob-
tain population distributions at which several actions maximize the Hamiltonian: Since
Q(·) and r(·) are continuous, also the Hamiltonian is continuous in m. Therefore, if we
fix the costate variables, the sets of population distributions in which a particular action
is a maximizer of the Hamiltonian are closed. Since the action space is finite and the
set of all population distribution vectors is connected, we obtain that if there is more
than one action that maximizes the Hamiltonian for some population distribution, then
the set of population distributions where several actions simultaneously maximize the
Hamiltonian is non-empty. This implies that for the case of finite action spaces the as-
sumption that a unique maximizer of the Hamiltonian exists is violated in all interesting
cases. Thus, new methods for the analysis of these models are necessary.
3. The Individual Control Problem
This section is devoted to the analysis of the individual control problem: We propose
a simple approach to determine which strategies are optimal for a given population
distribution and show that optimal stationary strategies are convex combinations of
particular deterministic stationary strategies.
We start by showing that given a stationary population distribution m ∈ P(S) the
individual player’s control problem is equivalent to a continuous time Markov decision
process with expected discounted reward criterion (see Guo and Herna´ndez-Lerma (2009)
for a definition and general results).
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Lemma 3.1. Let m ∈ P(S) be a population distribution. A Markovian randomized
strategy pi is optimal in our model given m, i.e. achieves for all x0 ∈ P(S) the maximum
value of V x0(pi
′,m) among all strategies pi′ ∈ Π, if and only if it is discounted reward
optimal for the continuous time Markov decision process with transition rates Qija(m),
rewards ria(m) and discount factor β. In particular, there is a stationary strategy pi ∈ Πs
that satisfies Vx0(pi,m) ≥ Vx0(pi′,m) for all x0 ∈ P(S) and all pi′ ∈ Π.
Proof. Assumption A1 ensures that the value function is finite for every population
distribution function and every individual strategy since ria(·) is, as a continuous function
on a compact space, uniformly bounded. Thus, we can rewrite the value function by
using the representation xi(t) =
∑
k∈S x
0
k · ppi0(0, k, t, i):
V x0(pi
0,m) =
∫ ∞
0
∑
i∈S
∑
a∈A
xi(t)ri,a(m)pi
0
i,a(t)e
−βtdt
=
∫ ∞
0
∑
i∈S
∑
a∈A
∑
k∈S
x0kp
pi0(0, k, t, i)ri,a(m)pi
0
i,a(t)e
−βtdt
=
∑
k∈S
x0k
∫ ∞
0
e−βt
∑
i∈S
∑
a∈A
ri,a(m)pi
0
ia(t)p
pi0(0, k, t, i)dt
=
∑
k∈S
x0k
∫ ∞
0
e−βtEpi0k
[
r(x(t), pi0t )
]
dt
=
∑
k∈S
x0kV
pi0
k (m),
where V pi
0
k (m) is the expected discounted reward of a continuous time Markov decision
process with expected discounted reward criterion with the above-mentioned rates and
rewards when the initial state is k. Since a strategy pi is optimal for the continuous time
Markov decision process if it maximizes all V pik (m) simultaneously, we obtain the desired
equivalence. The last statement directly follows for the classical theory for Markov
decision process, see for example Guo and Herna´ndez-Lerma (2009, Chapter 4).
Now, we show that the set of all optimal stationary strategies is the convex hull of all
deterministic optimal stationary strategies.
Theorem 3.2. Let m ∈ P(S). Write
D(m) = {d : S → A : d(i) ∈ Oi(m) for all i ∈ S}
with
Oi(m) = argmaxa∈A
{
ria(m) +
∑
j∈S
Qija(m)V
∗
j (m)
}
,
where V ∗(m) is the value function of the associated Markov decision process. Then D(m)
is non-empty. Furthermore, a stationary strategy is optimal for our model given m if
and only if it is a convex combination of strategies from D(m).
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Proof. By the previous lemma we know that the individual’s control problem is equiv-
alent to the continuous time Markov decision process with expected discounted reward
criterion with discount factor β, transition rates Qija(m) and reward function ria(m).
Since we consider a finite state space, we obtain, using the uniformization procedure (Guo
and Herna´ndez-Lerma (2009, Remark 6.1), Kakumanu (1977)), an equivalent discrete
time Markov decision process with expected discounted reward criterion. Its discount
factor is α = ||Q(m)||
β+||Q(m)|| . Writing ||Q(m)|| = supi∈S,a∈A−Qiia(m), the transition rates are
given by
P¯ija(m) =
Qija(m)
||Q(m)|| + δij
and the reward functions are given by
r¯ia(m) =
ria(m)
β + ||Q(m)|| .
Simple computations yield that
Oi(m) = argmaxa∈A
{
r¯ia(m) + αP¯ija(m)V˜
∗
j (m)
}
with V˜ ∗j (m) being the value function of the discrete time Markov decision process, which
is indeed equal to the value function of the continuous time Markov decision process (see
Kakumanu (1977) for details; note however, that he does not adjust the rewards, which
yields the proportional factor for the value functions in his setting).
Now we can prove the statement for discrete time Markov decision processes relying on
the rich theory developed for these problems (see Puterman (1994)): We first note that
the set D(m) in non-empty since A is finite. Moreover, by Puterman (1994, Corollary
6.2.8), any deterministic strategy in our set D(m) is indeed optimal. Enumerate D(m) =
{d1, . . . , dn} and let pi ∈ Πs be a convex combination of strategies in D(m), that is
pi =
n∑
i=1
λidi with λi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and
n∑
i=1
λi = 1.
By Puterman (1994, Theorem 6.1.1) the reward function given a certain stationary
strategy can be written as the unique solution of v = r¯pi(m) + αP¯ pi(m)v with
r¯pi(m)i =
∑
a∈A
piiar¯ia(m) and (P¯
pi)ij =
∑
a∈A
piiaP¯ija(m).
Noting that r¯pi and P¯ pi are linear in pi, we can rewrite the policy evaluation equation as
V pi = r¯pi + αP¯ piV pi =
n∑
i=1
λi(r¯
di + αP¯ diV pi).
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Since for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} the deterministic stationary strategy di is optimal it follows
that V pi = V ∗ is the unique solution of the policy evaluation equation:
rpi + αP piV ∗ =
n∑
i=1
λi(r
di + αP diV ∗) =
n∑
i=1
λiV
∗ = V ∗.
By Puterman (1994, Theorem 6.2.2 and Theorem 6.2.5), which states that in our setting
the unique solution of the optimality equation is V ∗, and by Puterman (1994, Theorem
6.2.6), which states that a strategy is optimal if and only if its value function is a solution
of the optimality equation, we obtain that the strategy pi is optimal.
To show the converse implication we assume that pi is not a convex combination of
deterministic strategies from D(m). One easily sees that there is still a representation
of pi as a convex combination of arbitrary deterministic strategies by considering
pi =
∑
d∈Ds
λdd with λd = pi1d(1) · . . . ·piSd(S).
Moreover, any convex combination of deterministic strategies representing the strategy
pi has a summand d /∈ D(m) with positive weight. This means that for the strategy d
there is a state i ∈ S and an action a˜ ∈ A\Oi(m) such that d(i) = a˜. This implies that
also the stationary strategy pi chooses that action a˜ in state i with positive probability,
that is piia˜ > 0. This means for the i-th component of the strategy’s expected discounted
reward:
V pi(i) = r¯pi(i) +
∑
j∈S
α(P¯ pi)ijV
pi(j)
=
∑
a∈A
piia
(
r¯ia(m) +
∑
j∈S
αP¯ija(m)V
pi(j)
)
≤
∑
a∈A
piia
(
r¯ia(m) +
∑
j∈S
αP¯ija(m)V
∗(j)
)
<
∑
a∈A
piia max
a′∈Ai
{
r¯ia′(m) +
∑
j∈S
αP¯ija′(m)V
∗(j)
}
= max
a′∈A
{
r¯ia′(m) +
∑
j∈S
αP¯ija′(m)V
∗(j)
}
= V ∗(i).
Note that the second lines follows from V pi ≤ V ∗ and the third line follows from the fact
that a˜ /∈ Oi is chosen with positive probability piia˜.
As now V pi(i) < V ∗(i) and by the finiteness of S and A an optimal strategy achieving
value V ∗ exists, it follows that pi is not optimal.
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We note that we reduced the problem of determining which of the infinitely many strate-
gies are indeed optimal for a given m ∈ P(S) to the problem of determining which of
the finitely many deterministic strategies are optimal.
This theorem yields a basic guideline for finding all mean field equilibria: For each point
m ∈ P(S) determine the set D(m) of all optimal strategies. Since there are only finitely
many deterministic stationary strategies, this yields to a partition of P(S). Let us write
Opt(A1× . . .×AS) for the set of all m ∈ P(S) such that d ∈ D(m) if and only if di ∈ Ai
for all i ∈ S. Thus, we then have to search in each of the sets Opt(A1 × . . . × AS) for
fixed points of the dynamics given all those deterministic stationary strategies satisfying
d(i) ∈ Ai for all i ∈ S.
Furthermore, the results allows us to prove that a game that is not trivial in the sense that
is there are two different population distributions such that different actions are optimal
for each of them, has a closed, non-empty set of points where infinitely many strategies
are optimal. Thus, we indeed have to consider infinitely many (potentially different)
fixed point problems in order to compute all stationary mean field equilibria. Indeed,
by the classical theory of Markov decision processes we know that those deterministic
strategies are optimal that maximize the expected discounted reward V d(m). Noting
that the expected discounted reward is given by
V d(m) = (βI −Qd(m))−1rd(m)
and that rd(·) and Qd(·) are continuous, it follows that also V d(·) is continuous. The
set of all those points where a certain strategy d is optimal is the preimage of [0,∞)S
under the continuous map V d(m) −maxd′∈Ds V d′(m) and thus closed. Whenever there
are two strategies that are optimal for distinct population distributions we have two
(or more) non-empty closed sets of points m ∈ P(S) for which a certain deterministic
strategy is one (but possibly not the only) optimal strategy. Since P(S) is itself closed
and connected, there will be a non-empty, closed set for which at least two deterministic
stationary strategies, and thus infinitely many stationary strategies are optimal.
4. Existence
In Section 3 we proved that there is a stationary strategy that is optimal among all (also
time-dependent) strategies. Moreover, we proved that a stationary strategy is optimal
for m ∈ P(S) if and only if it is a convex combination from D(m), which is the set of
all deterministic stationary strategies that are optimal.
Using this, we will prove that whenever the assumption A1 holds there exists a stationary
mean field equilibrium. We will adapt the ideas presented in Doncel et al. (2016a) to
prove this. More precisely, we will show the existence of a fixed point of an associated
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best response map in the dynamics. This map maps to each point m all the stationary
points of Qpi(m) given that pi is an optimal strategy for m. In contrast to the proof of the
existence of dynamic equilibria presented in Doncel et al. (2016a) we do not only rely on
standard calculus arguments, but instead the proof crucially relies on our probabilistic
representation of the problem.
We define the best response map φ : P(S) → 2P(S), where 2P(S) denotes the power set
of P(S), by setting
φ(m) := {x ∈ P(S)|∃pi ∈ conv(D(m)) : 0 = xTQpi(m)}.
We will now show using Kakutani’s fixed point theorem that this map has a fixed point
and that each fixed point of this map induces a stationary mean field equilibrium:
Theorem 4.1. Given assumption A1 there is a stationary mean field equilibrium.
Proof. We show that φ has a fixed point using Kakutani’s fixed point theorem (Bor-
der, 1985, Corollary 15.3), since any such fixed point yields to a stationary mean
field equilibrium: Indeed, for any fixed point m we find a strategy pi ∈ D(m) such
that 0 = mTQpi(m). Since by Lemma 3.1 and Theorem 3.2 we moreover have that
Vx0(pi,m) ≥ Vx0(pi′,m) for all x0 ∈ P(S) and all pi′ ∈ Π the pair (m,pi) constitutes a
stationary mean field equilibrium.
We first note that φ(m) is non-empty for all m ∈ P(S). By Theorem 3.2 the set D(m) is
non-empty. Since any continuous time Markov chain with finite state space has at least
one stationary distribution there exists an x ∈ P(S) such that 0 = xTQpi(m), which
yields that x ∈ φ(m).
Furthermore, for each m ∈ P(S) the set φ(m) is convex : Let x1, x2 ∈ φ(m) be two
distinct points. Then, by definition of φ, we find two strategies pi1, pi2 ∈ conv(D(m))
such that
0 =
∑
i∈S
∑
a∈A
x1iQija(m)pi
1
ia and 0 =
∑
i∈S
∑
a∈A
x2iQija(m)pi
2
ia.
Define z1ia := x
1
ipi
1
ia and z
2
ia = x
2
ipi
2
ia, which satisfy
0 =
∑
i∈S
∑
a∈A
Qija(m)z
1
ia and 0 =
∑
i∈S
∑
a∈A
Qija(m)z
2
ia.
Now let α ∈ [0, 1] be arbitrary and define x3 = αx1+(1−α)x2. Then z3 = αz1+(1−α)z2
satisfies
0 =
∑
i∈S
∑
a∈A
Qija(m)z
3
ia,
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which means that
pi3ia :=
{
0 if x3i = 0
z3ia/x
3
i if x
3
i > 0
satisfies 0 = (x3)TQpi
3
(m). It remains to verify that pi3 ∈ conv(D(m)). For this we
note that pi3ia > 0 of and only if z
3
ia > 0, which in turn is equivalent to the requirement
that z1ia > 0 or z
2
ia > 0. This can only happen if pi
1
ia > 0 or pi
2
ia > 0. Thus, since
pi1, pi2 ∈ conv(D(m)), also pi3 ∈ conv(D(m)).
We now verify that φ has a closed graph, that is, that for any sequence (mn)n∈N ∈ P(S)N
and xn ∈ φ(mn) for all n ∈ N with limn→∞mn = m and limn→∞ xn = x we indeed
have x ∈ φ(m): Let (mn, xn)n∈N be a converging sequence satisfying xn ∈ φ(mn) for
all n ∈ N. We denote its limit by (m,x). By definition of φ we find a sequence
pin ∈ conv(D(mn)) such that 0 = xnQpin(mn). By compactness of Πs we find a converging
subsequence (pink)k∈N with limit pi ∈ Πs. For any k ∈ N let Ak1 × . . . × AkS ⊆ AS be
such that pinkia > 0 for all i ∈ S, a ∈ Aki and piia = 0 for all i ∈ S, a /∈ Aki . Since
AS is finite we find a set A1 × . . . × AS that occurs infinitely often in the sequence
(Ak1× . . .×AkS)k∈N. From this we obtain that piia = 0 for all i ∈ S and a /∈ Ai. Moreover,
since pin ∈ conv(D(mn)) we obtain that for all l ∈ N such that A1×. . .×AS = Al1×. . .×Als
we have V d(mnl) = V ∗(mnl) for all deterministic strategies satisfying d(i) ∈ Ai for
all i ∈ S. By continuity of V d(·) and V ∗(·), we obtain that for all these strategies
V d(m) = V ∗(m). Thus, pi ∈ conv(D(m)). Furthermore, by continuity of Q(·), we obtain
that
0 =
∑
i∈A
∑
a∈A
xnki Qija(m
nk)pinkia ←
∑
i∈A
∑
a∈A
xiQija(m)piia,
which shows that x ∈ φ(m).
Using that P(A) is a compact metric space and that the graph of φ is closed, we obtain
that the values φ(m) are compact as the limit of any sequence xn ∈ φ(m) lies in φ(m).
Now Kakutani’s fixed point theorem (Border, 1985, Corollary 15.3) yields a fixed point
m ∈ φ(m), which proves the desired claim.
5. The Fixed Point Problem
5.1. The Cut Criterion
To solve the fixed point problem we have to determine the solutions of the equation
mTQpi(m) = 0 for all strategies pi that are optimal for some population distribution and
then we have to check whether pi is indeed optimal for these solutions. In many settings
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this task is not simple (see Section 6.2). However, often a cut criterion similar to the
one used for Markov chains is useful, although it is just a reformulation of the balance
equation mTQpi(m) = 0 (see Kelly (1979, Lemma 1.4) for a description of the criterion
for standard continuous time Markov chains). The criterion states that if we partition
the state space of the Markov chain into two sets, then the probability flow from one set
to the other has to equal the probability flow from this other set to the first.
The particular use of the criterion is that in most models that have been consider so
far there has always been a set of states for which the dynamics to and from this set
cannot be influenced by the player by choosing a particular strategy. This means that
any mean field equilibrium irrespective of the chosen strategy has to satisfy certain
equations coming from the cut criterion, which could be obtained from the standard
balance equations Qpi(m)m = 0 only by sensible rearrangements. In Section 6.2 we will
show that the criterion indeed simplifies the search for fixed points.
Theorem 5.1. Let pi be a stationary strategy and let T ⊆ S. Then any stationary
population distribution satisfies∑
j∈T
∑
i∈S\T
miQ
pi
ij(m) =
∑
j∈T
∑
i∈S\T
mjQ
pi
ji(m).
Proof. The stationarity condition reads for all j ∈ S
0 =
∑
i∈S
miQ
pi
ij(m),
furthermore, since Qpi(m) is conservative, we have for all j ∈ S
mj
∑
i∈S
Qpiji(m) = 0.
This yields for all j ∈ S ∑
i∈S
miQ
pi
ij(m) = mj
∑
i∈S
Qpiji(m).
Summing this identity over all j ∈ T yields∑
j∈T
∑
i∈S
miQ
pi
ij(m) =
∑
j∈T
∑
i∈S
mjQ
pi
ji(m).
Subtracting the identity ∑
j∈T
∑
i∈T
miQ
pi
ij(m) =
∑
j∈T
∑
i∈T
mjQ
pi
ji(m)
yields the desired result.
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5.2. Mean Field Equilibria are Fixed Points of a Specific Map
This section is devoted to proving an explicit characterization of φ(m), which has been
introduced in Section 4, in terms of the deterministic maps xd(·) for those strategies d
that are optimal for m. In order to show this we will need irreducibility of Qpi(m) for all
strategies pi ∈ Πs. Note that it is sufficient to verify irreducibility for all deterministic
strategies d ∈ Ds since any stationary strategy pi is a convex combination of deterministic
strategies and thus Qpi =
∑
d∈Ds λdQ
d is also irreducible.
The main consequence of Qpi(m) being irreducible is that there is a unique stationary
distribution of the continuous time Markov chain (CTMC) with generator Qpi(m) (see
Durrett (1999, Corollary I.4.6 and Theorem I.4.7), Norris (1997, Theorem 3.5.1)). This
observation allows us to formulate the main theorem, which we will prove in the rest of
the section:
Theorem 5.2. Let m ∈ P(S) such that Qd(m) is irreducible for all d ∈ Ds. Let,
furthermore, D(m) = {d1, . . . , dn} be the set of all deterministic optimal strategies for
m. Then
φ(m) = conv(xd1(m), . . . , xdn(m)),
with x = xdk(m) being the unique solution of 0 =
∑
i∈S
∑
a∈A xiQija(m)d
k
ia.
The proof of this theorem basically relies on the idea to characterize the stationary
distribution xpi(m) of the CTMC with irreducible generator Qpi(m) by a closed form
expression and to show thereafter that xpi(m) is a convex combination of (xd(m))d∈Ds .
In order to follow this programme we have to prove several properties of the generator
matrix Q starting with the following lemma regarding the structural properties of an
irreducible, conservative generator Q ∈ RS×S, more precisely regarding the minor Q′SS,
which arises from Q by deleting the last row and column:
Lemma 5.3. Let Q ∈ RS×S be an irreducible, conservative generator matrix. Then all
eigenvalues of the minor Q′SS have negative real part. Consequently Q
′
SS has full rank
and
sign(det(Q′SS)) = (−1)S+1.
The technical proof can be found in the appendix.
Noting the last column is the negative sum of all other columns we obtain the following
corollary:
Corollary 5.4. Let Q ∈ RS×S be an irreducible, conservative generator matrix. Then
the rank of Q is S − 1.
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With these two results, we can now explicitly characterize the stationary distribution
given a stationary strategy pi and a population distribution m:
Lemma 5.5. Let pi ∈ Πs be a stationary strategy and m ∈ P(S) such that Qpi(m)
is irreducible. Let Q˜pi(m) be the transpose (Qpi(m))T where the last row is replaced by
(1, . . . , 1). Then we have that the unique stationary distribution xpi(m) is given by
xpi(m) = (Q˜pi(m))−1 · (0, . . . , 0, 1)T . (2)
Furthermore, we can write
xpi(m)i =
1
det(Q˜pi(m))
(−1)S+i det(Qpi(m))′iS,
with
det(Q˜pi(m)) =
S∑
k=1
(−1)S+k det((Qpi(m))′kS.
Proof. The stationary distribution of our process is uniquely determined by (Asmussen,
2003, Theorem II.4.2)
0 =
∑
i∈S
xpii (m)Q
pi
ij(m) for all j ∈ S and
∑
i∈S
xpii (m) = 1. (3)
Since the last equation of the system 0 = xpi(m)TQpi(m) is the negative sum of all other
equations, we obtain that the system (3) is equivalent to
0
...
0
1
 =
Q
pi
11(m) . . . Q
pi
1,S−1(m) 1
...
...
...
QpiS,1(m) Q
pi
S,S−1(m) 1

T
xpi(m),
which by definition of Q˜pi is (0, . . . , 0, 1)T = Q˜pi(m)xpi(m).
We now show that the rank of the matrix Q˜pi(m) is S, as in this case we can invert
the matrix. As in Resnick (1992, p.137-139) we rely on the existence of the stationary
distribution given Qpi(m). In order to show that Q˜pi(m) has full rank, we show that
yT Q˜pi(m) = 0 implies that y = 0. For the stationary distribution xpi(m) given Qpi(m)
we have
0 =
(
yT Q˜pi(m)
)
xpi(m) = yT
(
Q˜pi(m)xpi(m)
)
= yT (0, . . . , 1)T = yS.
Thus,
0 = yT Q˜pi(m) = yT

Qpi11(m) . . . Q
pi
S1(m)
... . . .
...
Qpi1,S−1(m) . . . Q
pi
S,S−1(m)
1 . . . 1

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implies that
0 = (y1, . . . , yS−1)(Qpi(m))′SS.
Since by Lemma 5.3 the matrix (Qpi(m))′SS has full rank we obtain that y1 = . . . =
yS−1 = 0, which proves that Q˜pi(m) has full rank.
The last part of the statement simply follows from Cramer’s rule together with the
Laplace expansion of det(Q˜pi(m)) along the last line
det(Q˜pi(m)) =
S∑
k=1
(−1)S+k · 1 · det((Q˜pi(m))′Sk)
and the observation that
det((Q˜pi(m))′Sk) = det((det(Q
pi)T )′Sk) = det((Q
pi)′kS),
as Q˜pi(m) differs from Qpi(m)T only in the S-th row.
In order to establish the desired result on characterizing the convex set φ(m) solely in
terms of transition rates and rewards for deterministic strategies, one final preparation
has to be made: We have to show that the determinant of Q˜pi(m) has uniform sign over
all pi ∈ Πs: For this write d(a1,...,aS) for the deterministic strategy satisfying d(i) = ai.
Then it holds that
Q˜pi(m) :=
∑
(a1,...,aS)∈AS
(
S∏
i=1
piiai
)
Q˜d
(a1,...,aS)(m).
Now a simple application of the intermediate value theorem yields the desired result:
Lemma 5.6. Let m ∈ P(S) be a population distribution such that Qd(m) is irreducible
for all d ∈ Ds. Then det(Q˜pi(m)) has uniform sign over pi ∈ Πs.
Proof. We note that the map pi 7→ Q˜pi(m), which ranges from Πs to RS×S is continuous.
Since the determinant is also a continuous function, we see that pi 7→ det(Q˜pi(m)) is
a continuous function. By Lemma 5.5 we have that det(Q˜pi(m)) 6= 0 for all pi ∈ Πs.
If there would be a strategy pi1 and a strategy pi2 such that det(Q˜
pi1(m)) < 0 and
det(Q˜pi2(m)) > 0, then, by the intermediate value theorem, there would be a pi ∈ Πs
such that det(Q˜pi(m)) = 0, which would be a contradiction.
With all these preparations, we can now prove the characterization result stated in the
beginning of the section:
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Proof of Theorem 5.2. For readability we suppress the dependence of Q and x on m.
Let pi =
∑
(a1,...,an)∈AS λ(a1,...,aS)d
(a1,...,aS). Note that λ(a1,...,aS) is zero for all non-optimal
strategies by Theorem 3.2. With Qˆ being the matrix QT without the last row, we can
now write Q˜pi as follows:
Q˜pi =
(∑
a1∈A pi1a1Qˆ1,·,a1 . . .
∑
aS∈S piSaSQˆS,·,aS
1 . . . 1
)
.
As the determinant is linear in columns and we have
∑
ai∈A piiai = 1 for all i ∈ S we
obtain
det(Q˜pi) =
∑
a1∈A
pi1a1 det
(
Qˆ1,·,a1
∑
a2∈A pi2a2Qˆ2,·,a2 . . .
∑
aS∈S piSaSQˆS,·,aS
1 1 . . . 1
)
= . . .
=
∑
(a1,...,aS)∈AS
pi1a1 . . . piSaS det
(
Qˆ1,·,a1 . . . QˆS,·,aS
1 . . . 1
)
=
∑
(a1,...,aS)∈AS
pi1a1 . . . piSaS det(Q˜
d(a1,...,aS)) (4)
Similarly, we obtain using that(
Qd
(a1,...,ai−1,a˜i,ai+1,...,aS)
)′
Si
=
(
Qd
(a1,...,aS)
)′
Si
holds for all a1, . . . , aS, a˜i ∈ A, that
det(Q˜pi)′Si
=
∑
(a1,...,ai−1,ai+1,...aS)∈AS−1
pi1a1 · . . . ·pii−1,ai−1 · pii+1,ai+1 · . . . · piSaS det(Q˜d
(a1,...,ai−1,a˜i,ai+1,...,aS)
)′Si
for all a˜i ∈ A. This implies
(xpi)i =
1
det Q˜pi
(−1)S+i det((Q˜pi)′Si)
=
1
det Q˜pi
(−1)S+i
∑
ai∈A
piiai det((Q˜
pi)′Si)
=
1
det Q˜pi
(−1)S+i
∑
(a1,...,aS)∈AS
pi1a1 · . . . · piSaS det(Q˜d
(a1,...,aS))′Si
=
1
det Q˜pi
∑
(a1,...,aS)∈AS
pi1a1 · . . . · piSaS(−1)S+i det(Q˜d
(a1,...,aS))′Si
=
∑
(a1,...,aS)∈AS
pi1a1 · . . . · piSaS det(Q˜d(a1,...,aS))
det(Q˜pi)
· (xda1,...,aS )i.
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Thus, we see that xpi is a linear combination of xd
(a1,...,aS) for any stationary strategy pi
and the coefficients are given by
λ(a1,...,aS) =
pi1a1 · . . . · piSaS det(Q˜da1,...,aS )
det(Q˜pi)
.
From (4) we obtain that ∑
(a1,...,aS)∈AS
λ(a1,...,aS) = 1.
By Lemma 5.6 we note that the signs of the determinants Q˜pi and Q˜pi
′
are the same for any
two strategies pi, pi′. Thus, as piia ≥ 0 for all i ∈ S, a ∈ A we obtain that λ(a1,...,aS) ≥ 0 for
all (a1, . . . , aS) ∈ AS. To conclude, writing D(m) = {d1, . . . , dn}, every point in φ(m) is
a convex combination of xd1 , . . . , xdn . Moreover, any convex combination of xd
1
, . . . , xd
n
is the stationary point given a strategy pi ∈ conv(D(m)), which by Theorem 3.2 yiels
that these points lie in φ(m).
Thus, in order to find all mean field equilibria it is sufficient to follow the following
programme: First, compute for all sets A1 × . . . ,×AS ⊆ AS the set Opt(A1 × . . . AS),
which collects all those points m ∈ P(S) for which D(m) = {d ∈ DS : d(i) ∈ Ai}.
Second, find all fixed points of the map (conv{x(a1,...,aS)(·) : (a1, . . . , aS) ∈ A1× . . .×AS},
that lie in Opt(A1× . . . AS). Writing FP (f) for the set of all fixed points of the map f ,
we obtain the following result:
Theorem 5.7. Assume that there is a set T ⊆ P(S) such that for all m ∈ T and all
pi ∈ Πs the matrix Qpi(m) is irreducible. Then the set of all distributions lying in T
induced by some stationary mean field equilibrium is given by⋃
A1×...×AS⊆AS
(
FP (conv{x(a1,...,aS)(·) : (a1, . . . , aS) ∈ A1 × . . .× AS}
∩Opt(A1 × . . .× AS)
)
.
In case of constant dynamics, that is Qija(m) = Qija for all m ∈ P(S) the second
step of this programme is simple, since the maps xd(·) are constant with value (Q˜d)−1 ·
(0, . . . , 0, 1)T and this implies that the unique fixed point is (Q˜d)−1 · (0, . . . , 0, 1)T . Thus,
we can characterize the set of all mean field equilibria as explicitly by only computing
the optimality sets and the stationary points given Qd as follows:
Corollary 5.8. Let the dynamics be constant, that is Qija(m) = Qija for all m ∈
P(S), and let the generators Qd given any strategy d be irreducible. Then the set of all
distributions induced by some stationary MFE is given by⋃
A1×...×AS⊆AS
(
conv{(Q˜(a1,...,aS))−1 · (0, . . . , 0, 1)T : (a1, . . . , aS) ∈ A1 × . . .× AS}
∩Opt(A1 × . . .× AS)
)
.
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6. Examples
This section presents two mean field game models, which have been considered in sim-
ilar versions in the literature before, and illustrates the application of the techniques
presented before. For both examples we will first solve the individual control problem
given a fixed population distribution and compute given this the non-empty optimality
sets Opt(A1 × . . . AS). Thereafter we will solve the fixed point problems relyin on the
approaches introduced before and sketch how the full characterization of the equilibria
can be obtained.
6.1. A Consumer Choice Model
The model we present now is a model with constant dynamics, that is, the dynamics do
not depend on the current population distribution. The context and utility function are
similar to a model introduced by Gomes et al. (2014) as a toy example on which the au-
thors demonstrated numerical methods for a specific class of finite state mean field game
models, namely those yielding systems of hyperbolic partial differential equations. Note
however, that the action spaces and choice options of the players differ systematically.
The model is inspired by consumer choices in the mobile phone sector. The utility of
using a certain provider is increasing in the share of customers using it, whereas the costs
are constant. We assume that the utility coming from the other customers in service is
given by the isoelastic utility function ln(mi) + si, with si ∈ R. Note that since ln(mi)
is always negative for our choice of mi, one cannot interpret si as costs directly, but one
rather has to think of si consisting of two components: the costs themselves and some
base utility from service provision. The players can now choose in our model whether to
stick to their provider i or whether to switch to the other provider, in this case the player
additionally faces a time-unit switching cost ci ≥ 0. Note that for technical reasons it is
important that the player always faces independent of the chosen strategy a small risk
of going to the other provider.
These choice options differ substantially from the model in Gomes et al. (2014), where
the players could continuously control the rates at which they switch to the other state
and were facing costs corresponding to the square of the rate. From an applied point of
view it is questionable, in particular when agents are not experts in the game at hand,
that players indeed understand what it means to control the transition rates of a Markov
chain. Indeed, economic experiments show that most people cannot understand the true
effect of random devices even in simple settings (Walker and Wooders, 2008).
The formal description of the model is now given as follows: For technical reasons (i.e.
to define the rewards for the case mi = 0 properly) we introduce for small enough δ > 0
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the function fδ : R→ R given by
y 7→
{
1
2δ
y2 + δ
2
if y ≤ δ
y if y > δ
,
which is increasing on [0, 1]. Using this we then define the transition rates and reward
functions by
Qchange =
(−b b
b −b
)
Qstay =
(− 
 −
)
rchange =
(
ln(fδ(m1)) + s1 − c
ln(fδ(m2)) + s2 − c
)
rstay =
(
ln(fδ(m1)) + s1
ln(fδ(m2)) + s2
)
,
where 0 <  < b and s1, s2, c > 0.
In order to analyse the model we first solve the optimality equations
βV1(m) = max{ln(fδ(m1)) + s1 − c− bV1(m) + bV2(m),
ln(fδ(m1)) + s1 − V1(m) + V2(m)}
βV2(m) = max{ln(fδ(m2)) + s2 − c+ bV1(m)− bV2(m),
ln(fδ(m2)) + s2 + V1(m)− V2(m)},
which directly yield that it is optimal to change in state 1 if and only if V1(m)−V2(m) ≤
− c
b− and that it is optimal to change in state 2 if and only if V1(m) − V2(m) ≥ cb− .
Thus, we know that choosing to change in both states is never optimal. Therefore we
focus on the three potentially optimal strategies {change}×{stay}, {stay}×{stay} and
{stay} × {change}. The expected discounted reward given these strategies is
V {change}×{stay}(m)
=
(
βI −Q{change}×{stay})−1 r{change}×{stay}
=
(
β + b −b
− β + 
)−1(
ln(fδ(m1)) + s1 − c
ln(fδ(m2)) + s2
)
=
1
β(β + b+ )
(
β +  b
 β + b
)(
ln(fδ(m1)) + s1 − c
ln(fδ(m2)) + s2
)
=
1
β(β + b+ )
(
(ln(fδ(m1)) + s1) · (β + )− c · (β + ) + (ln(fδ(m2)) + s2) · b
(ln(fδ(m1)) + s1) · − c · + (ln(fδ(m2)) + s2) · (β + b)
)
V {stay}×{stay}(m)
=
(
β +  −
− β + 
)−1(
ln(fδ(m1)) + s1
ln(fδ(m2)) + s2
)
=
1
β2 + 2β
(
(ln(fδ(m1)) + s1) · (β + ) + (ln(fδ(m2)) + s2) · 
(ln(fδ(m1)) + s1) · + (ln(fδ(m2)) + s2) · (β + )
)
V {stay}×{change}(m)
23
=(
β +  −
−b β + b
)−1(
ln(fδ(m1)) + s1
ln(fδ(m2)) + s2 − c
)
=
1
β(β + b+ )
(
(ln(fδ(m1)) + s1) · (β + b)− c · + (ln(fδ(m2)) + s2) · 
(ln(fδ(m1)) + s1) · b− c · (β + ) + (ln(fδ(m2)) + s2) · (β + )
)
.
In order to understand which strategy is optimal, we compute the differences V d1 (m)−
V d2 (m):
V
{change}×{stay}
1 (m)− V {change}×{stay}2 (m)
=
1
β + b+ 
(−c+ ln(fδ(m1))− ln(fδ(m2)) + s1 − s2)
V
{stay}×{stay}
1 (m)− V {stay}×{stay}2 (m)
=
1
β + 2
(ln(fδ(m1))− ln(fδ(m2)) + s1 − s2)
V
{stay}×{change}
1 (m)− V {stay}×{change}2 (m)
=
1
β + b+ 
(c+ ln(fδ(m1))− ln(fδ(m2)) + s1 − s2)
Using that fδ(·) is increasing and that m1 = 1 −m2 we obtain for small enough δ > 0
that
V
{change}×{stay}
1 (m)− V {change}×{stay}2 (m) ≤ −
c
b− 
⇔ −c+ ln(fδ(m1))− ln(fδ(m2)) + s1 − s2 ≤ −c(β + b+ )
b− 
⇔ ln
(
m1
1−m1
)
≤ −c(β + 2)
b−  − s1 + s2
⇔ m1 ≤
exp
(
−c(β+2)
b− − s1 + s2
)
1 + exp
(
−c(β+2)
b− − s1 + s2
)
and analogously we obtain
−c
b−  ≤ V
{stay}×{stay}
1 (m)− V {stay}×{stay}2 ≤
c
b− 
⇔
exp
(
−c(β+2)
b− − s1 + s2
)
1 + exp
(
−c(β+2)
b− − s1 + s2
) ≤ m1 ≤ exp
(
c(β+2)
b− − s1 + s2
)
1 + exp
(
c(β+2)
b− − s1 + s2
)
as well as
c
b−  ≤ V
{stay}×{change}
1 (m)− V {stay}×{change}2 (m)
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⇔
exp
(
c(β+2)
b− − s1 + s2
)
1 + exp
(
c(β+2)
b− − s1 + s2
) ≤ m1.
As a next step we compute the fixed points given the three strategies {change}×{stay},
{stay}× {stay} and {stay}× {change}, noting that we never need to consider the fixed
point given {change} × {change}, as it is never optimal to randomize in both states.
Since we face standard continuous time Markov chains, this task is simple and we obtain
for each strategy a unique fixed point:
x{change}×{stay} =
(

b+
b
b+
)
, x{stay}×{stay} =
(
1
2
1
2
)
, x{stay}×{change} =
(
b
b+

b+
)
.
Depending on the choice of parameters we have between one and five equilibria: For
simplicity we write
d1 =
exp
(
−c(β+2)
b− − s1 + s2
)
1 + exp
(
−c(β+2)
b− − s1 + s2
) and d2 = exp
(
c(β+2)
b− − s1 + s2
)
1 + exp
(
c(β+2)
b− − s1 + s2
)
and note that we always have d1 < d2.
We can now obtain the exact number and position of equilibria by coefficient comparison.
The strategies that are used in mixed strategy equilibria are then obtained by solving
the balance equation mTQpi(m) = 0 with m being the population distribution of the
mixed strategy equilibrium. We will omit this last step, which is basically the task of
solving a system of linear equations.
(i) If d1 <

b+
and d2 <
1
2
, then x{stay}×{change} together with the deterministic strategy
{stay} × {change} is the unique stationary mean field equilibrium.
(ii) If d1 <

b+
and 1
2
≤ d2 ≤ bb+ , then x{stay}×{stay} together with the deterministic
strategy {stay}×{stay} and x{stay}×{change} together with the deterministic strategy
{stay}×{change} are the deterministic equilibria. Furthermore, there is one mixed
strategy equilibrium with m1 = d2 that randomizes over {stay} and {change} in
the second state. If k2 ∈ {12 , bb+}, then the mixed strategy equilibrium coincides
with the pure strategy equilibrium with the same population distribution.
(iii) If d1 <

b+
and b
b+
< d2, then the only equilibrium is given by x
{stay}×{stay} together
with the deterministic strategy {stay} × {stay}.
(iv) If 
b+
≤ d1 ≤ 12 and d2 < 12 , then x{stay}×{change} together with the determinis-
tic strategy {stay} × {change} and x{change}×{stay} together with the deterministic
strategy {change} × {stay} are the deterministic equilibria. Furthermore, there
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is a mixed strategy equilibrium at the point with m1 = d1 that randomizes over
{stay} and {change} in the first state. If k1 = b+ , then the mixed strategy equi-
librium coincides with the pure strategy equilibrium with the same population
distribution.
(v) If 
b+
≤ d1 ≤ 12 and 12 ≤ d2 ≤ bb+ , then x{stay}×{change} together with the deter-
ministic strategy {stay} × {change}, x{stay}×{stay} together with the deterministic
strategy {stay}×{stay} and x{change}×{stay} together with the deterministic strategy
{change}×{stay} are the deterministic equilibria. Furthermore, there is one mixed
strategy equilibrium with m1 = d1 that randomizes over {stay} and {change} in
the first state and one mixed strategy equilibrium with m1 = d2 that randomizes
over {stay} and {change} in the second state. If k1 ∈ { b+ , 12} or k2 ∈ {12 , bb+},
then the mixed strategy equilibrium coincides with the pure strategy equilibrium
with the same population distribution.
(vi) If 
b+
≤ d1 ≤ 12 and bb+ < d2, then x{stay}×{stay} together with the deterministic
strategy {stay}×{stay} and x{change}×{stay} together with the deterministic strategy
{change}×{stay} are the deterministic equilibria. Furthermore, there is one mixed
strategy equilibrium with m1 = d1 that randomizes over {stay} and {change} in
the first state. If k1 ∈ { b+ , 12}, then the mixed strategy equilibrium coincides with
the pure strategy equilibrium with the same population distribution.
(vii) If 1
2
< d1 and
1
2
< d2 ≤ bb+ , then x{stay}×{change} together with the determinis-
tic strategy {stay} × {change} and x{change}×{stay} together with the deterministic
strategy {change} × {stay} are the deterministic equilibria. Furthermore, there
is a mixed strategy equilibrium at the point with m1 = d2 that randomizes over
{stay} and {change} in the second state. If k2 = bb+ , then the mixed strategy
equilibrium coincides with the pure strategy equilibrium with the same population
distribution.
(viii) If 1
2
< d1 and
b
b+
< d2, then then x
{change}×{stay} together with the deterministic
strategy {change} × {stay} is the unique stationary mean field equilibrium.
6.2. A Simplified Corruption Model
We now consider a simplified version of the corruption model presented in Kolokoltsov
and Malafeyev (2017): In their model a player can be in one of the three states honest
(H), corrupt (C) and reserved (R). The corrupt players get a higher wage than the
honest players, which in turn get a higher wage than the reserved players that have been
convicted to be corrupt. For simplicity we set wC = 10, wH = 5 and wR = 0 and exclude
the fine for being convicted, which is an additional feature in their model. The players
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can choose given that they are not reserved, whether they want to stay corrupt/honest
or whether they want to switch behaviour. In this case they become honest/corrupt with
the rate b. A player that is reserved is recovered with a fixed rate r and we assume that
he will then be honest. Additionally the model captures “social pressure” in two ways:
First, the more players are corrupt the higher is the pressure (one cannot escape) to also
become corrupt. Second, the more players are honest the higher is the rate to become
convicted to be corrupt. In the model of Kolokoltsov and Malafeyev (2017) there is also
a principal agent that convicts players, for simplicity we decided to ignore this feature
of the model as well.
C:10P H:5P
R:0P
b/0
b+ qinfmC/qinfmC
qsocmH r
Figure 1: Representation of the second example
The formal characterization is given by A = {change, stay} together with
Qchange =
−(b+ qsocmH) b qsocmHb+ qinfmC −(b+ qinfmC) 0
0 r −r

Qstay =
−qsocmH 0 qsocmHqinfmC −qinfmC 0
0 r −r

and cchange = cstay = (10, 5, 0)
T , where all parameters b, qinf, qsoc and r are strictly
positive. A visualization of this model is given in Figure 1.
We start with computing the value function for given m ∈ P(S) as the unique solution
of
βV1(m) = max{10− (b+ qsocmH)V1(m) + bV2(m) + qsocmHV3(m),
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10− qsocmHV1(m) + qsocmHV3(m)}
βV2(m) = max{5 + (b+ qinfmC)V1(m)− (b+ qinfmC)V2,
5 + qinfmCV1(m)− qinfmCV2(m)}
βV3(m) = rV2(m)− rV3(m).
We directly see that one should choose to change in state 1 if V1(m) ≤ V2(m) and to stay
in state 1 if V1(m) ≥ V2(m) and one should chose to change in state 2 if V1(m) ≥ V2(m)
and to stay in state 2 if V2(m) ≥ V1(m). A straightforward calculation yields that the
optimality sets are given by
Opt({stay} × {change}) =
{
m ∈ P(S) : mH < r + β
qsoc
}
Opt({change} × {stay}) =
{
m ∈ P(S) : mH > r + β
qsoc
}
Opt({stay, change} × {stay, change}) =
{
m ∈ P(S) : mH = r + β
qsoc
}
.
Note however, that depending on the choice of parameters the quantity r+β
qsoc
is greater
than one, exactly one or less than one. In the first case only Opt({stay} × {change})
is non-empty, in the second case Opt({stay} × {change}) and Opt({stay, change} ×
{stay, change}) are non-empty and in the third case all optimality sets are non-empty.
As a second step we use the cut criterion from Theorem 5.1 for the set T = {R}, which
yields the equation qsocmHmC = rmR for all stationary strategies. Together with the
equation 1 = mR +mH +mC we obtain
qsocmHmC = r(1−mH −mC)⇔ mH(qsocmC + r) = r − rmC
⇔ mH = r(1−mC)
qsocmC + r
or equivalently mC = r(1 − mH)/(qsocmH + r), note that this representations directly
imply that mC ∈ [0, 1] ⇔ mH ∈ [0, 1]. Furthermore we obtain that the sum of mC and
mH is always less than one, thus any mean field equilibrium is uniquely characterized by
describing mC . More precisely, any stationary mean field equilibrium has a distribution
of the form (
mC ,
r − rmC
qsocmC + r
,
qsoc − qsocm2C
qsocmC + r
)
. (5)
It now remains to consider the fixed point problems given the possible optimal strategies:
We start by noting that stationary points of the dynamics given {stay}×{change} exists
whenever (5) and
−qsocmCmH + qinfmCmH + bmH = 0⇔ mH(mC(qsoc − qinf)− b) = 0
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is satisfied, which is true if mH = 0 or mC = b/(qsoc − qinf). Thus whenever these
points lie in Opt({stay}× {change}) or Opt({stay, change}× {stay, change}) we have a
deterministic mean field equilibrium given the strategy {stay} × {change}.
Similarly, stationary points of the dynamics given {change}× {stay} have to satisfy (5)
and
−bmC − qsocmHmC + qinfmCmH = 0⇔ mC(mH(qinf − qsoc)− b) = 0,
which is true if either mC = 0 or mH = b/(qinf− qsoc). Thus whenever these points lie in
Opt({change}×{stay}) or Opt({stay, change}×{stay, change}) we have a deterministic
mean field equilibrium given the strategy {change} × {stay}.
When searching for stationary points given the dynamics of mixed strategies, which
might be equilibria,we can restrict to those that lie inside the set Opt({stay, change} ×
{stay, change}). In this set all equilibria have to satisfy mH = r+βqsoc , that is
r + β
qsoc
=
1−mC
qsoc
r
mC + 1
⇔ mC = r(qsoc − r − β)
(2r + β)qsoc
.
It remains to check whether there is a strategy such that the point(
r(qsoc − r − β)
(2r + β)qsoc
,
r + β
qsoc
,
(r + β)(qsoc − r − β)
(2r + β)qsoc
)
is indeed a fixed point for the individual dynamics equation given strategy pi, which
means that we have to find constants pi1,change and pi2,change that satisfy for this point
(−pi1,changeb− qsocmH)mC + pi2,changebmH + qinfmCmH = 0,
which is parameter-dependent.
As in the previous example, we would now need to perform a case analysis to obtain the
exact set of mean field equilibria for all possible equilibrium constellations. Additionally,
we would need to solve the balance equations mTQ(m) = 0 for pi for any m that is a
candidates for randomized equilibria. Both tasks are simple, but tedious and we omit
them here.
A. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 5.3. Since we face a conservative generator, we see by definition that
Qij ≥ 0 for all i 6= j and that
∑
j∈S Qij = 0. Thus, all off-diagonal entries of Q are
non-negative and the row sum is always zero. Furthermore, by requiring irreducibility
we do not have a row of zeros, thus the diagonal entries are strictly negative.
29
The matrix Q′SS again has non-negative off-diagonal entries, strictly negative diagonal
entries and row sum is less or equal zero. Furthermore the irreducibility of Q implies
that QiS is non-zero for at least one i ∈ {1, . . . , S− 1} and thus the row sum for at least
one i is strictly negative. We now show that there exists a vector x ∈ RS−1 such that
x ≥ 0 and xi > 0 for at least one i ∈ {1, . . . , S − 1} such that −Q′SSx > 0 (where the
inequality signs hold pointwise).
For this we first note that for all k ∈ {1, . . . , S − 1}
(Q′SSx)k =
S−1∑
l=1
xl(−Q′SS)kl =
S−1∑
l=1
xl(−Q)kl
=
∑
l∈{1,...,S−1}\{k}
−xlQkl + xk · (−Q)kk
=
∑
l∈{1,...,S−1}\{k}
−xlQkl + xk
∑
l∈S\{k}
Qkl
=
∑
l∈{1,...,S−1}\{k}
(xk − xl)Qkl + xkQkS.
From which one directly sees that (Q′SSx)k is increasing in xk and decreasing in xl since
Qkl > 0 for all l 6= k.
Define for all x ∈ ([0,∞))S−1 the set T (x) = {k ∈ {1, . . . , S − 1} : (Q′SSx)k > 0} as the
set of all indices where the i-th component of Q′SSx is greater than zero. We will now
define inductively an sequence xn ∈ RS a sequence of vectors such that for some m ∈ N
we have T (xm) = {1, . . . , S − 1}. We will start with the vector x0 with a one at every
component and construct xn in such a way that T (xn−1) ( T (xn) for all n ∈ N and
moreover xni > 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , S − 1} and all n ∈ N0.
Starting with x0 being the vector of ones directly implies that T (x0) 6= ∅, as we have
previously seen that the row sum, which is (Q′SSx
0)i is positive for some index i ∈
{1, . . . , S − 1}.
In the n-th step (n ∈ N) we check whether T (xn−1) = {1, . . . , S − 1}. If this is the case
we have shown that a vector with the desired properties exists, else there is an index
j ∈ {1, . . . , S−1}\T (xn−1). In this case let i ∈ T (xn−1). Since our CTMC is irreducible
the underlying transition graph is strongly connected, which implies that there is a path
from j to i. Let k˜ be the first node on this path that lies in T (xn−1) and let k be its
predecessor. Note that by definition of the transition graph Qkk˜ > 0. Now let x
n be as
follows xni = x
n−1
i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , S − 1} \ {k˜} and xnk˜ such that
0 < xn
k˜
< xn−1
k˜
and (Q′SSx
n)k˜ > 0.
This is possible as xn−1
k˜
> 0 and (Q′SSx
n−1)k˜ > 0 and moreover (Q
′
SSx)k˜ is continuous
and increasing in xk˜.
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It is obvious that xnl > 0 for all l ∈ {1, . . . , S − 1}. It remains to check whether
m ∈ T (xn−1) implies m ∈ T (xn) and to show that k ∈ T (xn), as this proves that
T (xn−1) ( T (xn).
As Q′SS(x
n)k˜ > 0 by construction it is obvious that k˜ ∈ T (xn). For m 6= k˜ we see again
as (Q′SSx)m is decreasing in xk˜ and x
n
m = x
n−1
m that
(Q′SSx
n)m =
∑
l∈{1,...,S−1}\{m}
(xnm − xnl )Qml + xnmQmS
≥
∑
l∈{1,...,S−1}\{m}
(xn−1m − xn−1l )Qml + xmQmS = (Q′SSxn−1)m.
Thus if m ∈ T (xn−1), then m ∈ T (xn).
For m = k we have a strict inequality as (xnk −xnk˜)Qkk˜ > (xn−1k −xn−1k˜ )Qkk˜ since Qkk˜ > 0
and xn
k˜
< xn−1
k˜
. Thus (Q′SSx
n)k > (Q
′
SSx
n−1)k = 0, which directly implies k ∈ T (xn),
thus T (xn−1) ( T (xn).
Thus, we indeed obtained a vector x ∈ RS−1 such that x ≥ 0 and xi > 0 for at least one
i ∈ {1, . . . , S − 1} such that −Q′SSx > 0. Now we can conclude that it is a non-singular
M -matrix in the sense of Berman and Plemmons (1979, Chapter 6) and furthermore
that all eigenvalues of our matrix have positive real part. Therefore, all eigenvalues of
QSS have negative real part.
As the matrix QSS is real, all complex eigenvalues appear in pairs of complex conjugates.
As the product of a complex number and its complex conjugate is non-negative, we
obtain that the determinant which can be computed as the product of all eigenvalues
is as claimed since only the number of real eigenvalues or more specifically the parity
of this number matters for the sign of the determinant. As the parity of the number of
real eigenvalues always equals the parity of S − 1, we conclude that the sign pattern of
the determinant is as claimed.
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